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Abstract:  This paper develops a model of the structure of protection across
industries.  We model five types of agents:  policy makers, producers, importers,
workers, and consumers.  The model implies that protection increases with workforce
size and decreases with lobbying costs.  The effects of both output and imports are
ambiguous.  We test the model with US data, including new measures of protection,
and confirm most of its implications.  We do not find evidence that protection increases
with output.  The empirical results also suggest that policy makers weight campaign
contributions about 12 per cent more heavily than national income.  (JEL D72,F13)
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1 INTRODUCTION
Pervasive protection continues to impose great economic losses on all countries,
despite decades of postwar liberalization.
1  Protection’s prevalence has justifiably
generated numerous inquiries into its causes.  One important question that remains
unresolved is:  How do we account for the pattern of protection across industries?  In
other words, why do some sectors receive lots of protection and thus extract lots of
rents from the rest of society, while other sectors do not?
Shedding light on this topic should be useful for both theory and policy.  As for
theory, work in the political economy of protection has shown that political forces can
significantly alter standard trade theory results.
2  As for policy, knowing what causes
protection can guide policy makers in their efforts to remove barriers.  Richardson 1993,
for instance, shows that free trade agreements may be preferred to customs unions
because the former are more likely to lead to a further decline in protection once the
agreement is signed.
Researchers have conducted numerous econometric analyses of the structure of
protection across industries, but this work yields no clear conclusions because of the
failure to combine explicit modeling with well-specified empirical tests.
3  Another
                                           
1 Hufbaur and Elliott 1994 estimate that the annual deadweight losses from protection in the US are at
least $10 billion.  For Japan, Sazanami et al 1995 estimate the losses at $17 billion annually.
2  For instance, Brainard and Verdier 1993 shows that the connection between price changes and output
may not be as simple as is implied by the standard trade models.  They develop a model in which
industries that have greater political influence receive greater protection from price shocks and thus
maintain higher long run outputs.  Thus, this work implies that the standard results from the specific
factors model and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem need to be modified to take account of the varying
ability of industries to win insulation from price declines.  This is but one example of how a clearer
understanding of what induces protection makes it possible to model trade more accurately.
3 See, for example, Cheh 1974, Caves 1976, Helleiner 1977, Ray 1981, Marvel and Ray 1983, Baldwin
1985, Godek 1985, Goldstein 1988, Hansen 1990, Trefler 1993, Finger and Harrison 1996, and Gawande
1998.  Magee, Brock and Young 1989 and Rodrik 1995 survey this large literature. Trefler’s 1993 article3
problem with these empirical analyses concerns data: one wonders how accurately the
amount of protection has been measured.  Using just tariff rates would be misleading,
since governments use a wide range of hard-to-measure, under-the-table methods to
protect domestic industries.  Also, since tariffs have been negotiated to very low levels
through the World Trade Organization, the relative importance of under-the-table
methods has increased.  Given all this, it is quite difficult to know just how much
protection an industry enjoys.  A number of researchers have estimated protection
levels across industries in advanced countries, but these estimates suffer from flaws
that render the data suspect.  This study will use new measures of protection that we
believe are more trustworthy than previous ones (see Bradford 1998).
Grossman and Helpman broke new theoretical ground with their 1994 article by
developing a model in which they derived an expression for the structure of protection
across industries.  Their model (the GH model) implies that the amount of protection
depends positively on the ratio of output to imports, negatively on the elasticity of import
demand, and negatively on the weight that the government places on social welfare.
Goldberg and Maggi 1997 confirms empirically the main GH prediction—that protection
is increasing in the ratio of output to imports.  Goldberg and Maggi include variables
outside of the GH framework and find that none of several possible augmented
                                                                                                                                            
is probably the best among those that are not guided by modeling.  He is careful to correct for
endogeneity and submits his results to a number of sensitivity tests.  He also has an excellent data set,
upon which we have relied.  Another intriguing piece is Gawande 1998.  This article is the only one of
which we are aware that conducts tests of several political economy of trade models against each other,
instead of the usual approach of testing one’s favorite model against the easily rejected null of no model.
She does not, however, correct for endogeneity, since incorporating it into her Bayesian framework is too
unwieldy.  She finds that the two most likely determinants of protection are special interest lobbying and
voting, two prominent features of our model.4
regressions leads to a significant improvement in fit.  They do not, however, test the GH
model against an alternative.
This paper develops a new model of the structure of protection across industries.
We model five types of agents:  policy makers choose protection levels so as to
maximize votes, producers and importers seek to maximize rents through lobbying, and
workers and consumers vote according to protection’s effect on their economic well-
being.  Our model generalizes the GH model and captures formally, the connection
between protection and jobs and the role of importers in the protection game.
4  With
importers, the model can also accommodate all kinds of trade barriers, not just tariffs.
The model implies that protection increases with workforce size and decreases with
lobbying costs and the elasticity of import demand.  The effects of both output and
imports are shown to be ambiguous.
We test the model with US data, including our new measures of protection, and
confirm its predictions.  Thus, we show that our theoretical generalization of the GH
framework is empirically meaningful.  The empirical results also imply that policy makers
place about 12% more weight on campaign contributions than on national income and
that about one million votes are lost for each $1 billion reduction in national income.
                                           




Assume that the economy is too small to affect world prices, so that we may
always take these to be exogenously given.  All consumers have the same preferences
given by the following quasilinear utility function:
) (x u + x = u i i
n
1 = i 0 ￿ .            (1)
The first good is the numeraire, and its domestic and world prices are always 1.  It is
assumed that total spending by all consumers is high enough such that the numeraire
will absorb all income effects.  Each of the subutility functions is well behaved:
differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Consumer surplus generated from consumption of each of the non-numeraire
goods is given by:
) ( )] ( [ ) ( i i i i i i i i p d p - p d u p s = ,                            (2)
si(pi): total consumer surplus derived from consumption of good i,
pi: the price of good i,
)] ( [ i i i p d u : sum of utilities over all consumers of good i,
) ( i i p d : the total demand for good i.
There is, of course, no surplus derived from consumption of the numeraire.
                                           
5 This section follows GH.6
2.2  The Production Structure, Capitalists, and Workers
For the production side of the market, consider a modified version of the specific
factors model.  As with the standard model, assume that all goods are produced under
constant returns to scale and that goods markets are competitive.  Also, each good
requires the use of both specific capital, which is completely immobile, and mobile labor.
Unlike the standard model, however, the wage in each sector is fixed at some level
above that which would clear the market.  This could result, for instance, from union
bargaining or from efficiency wage considerations.  Such a wage structure creates
unemployment and thus a connection between jobs and protection.
With the wage set artificially high, the amount of labor employed depends strictly
on labor demand and thus, with technology fixed, only on the price.  We have, therefore,





L L = , where Li is the amount of labor employed in industry i, and  i w  is the
fixed wage.  Price decreases cause the real wage to increase, and workers get laid off.
Price hikes cause the real wage to decrease, and unemployed workers get hired.
6
With wages fixed, the total reward to specific capital depends only on the price of
the good produced:  ) ( i i i p p p = .  Here, pi is the total returns to specific capital in industry
i.  This profit function, which is increasing in the price of the good, creates the incentive
for specific capital owners to lobby for protection.
                                           
6  One might think it more reasonable to allow wages to move, as well as employment.  Wages are
assumed to be fixed because it makes the model cleaner and because there is evidence to indicate that
employment is quite a bit more flexible than wages in the short run.  Revenga 1992 shows that the import
price elasticity of wages in the early 80s—the same time period from which our data is drawn—is
significant but small, only .06 to .09.  The corresponding elasticities for employment are .24 to .39.  Also,
since any one industry is small relative to the rest of the economy, price changes within a single industry
will probably have a small impact on overall wages.7
2.3 The Government’s Objective and the Imposition of Protection
The government is modeled as a single agent that has the power to impose trade
barriers as it pleases in each industry.  The government chooses for each industry a
domestic price between the world price and the price that results in no imports.
7
The key consideration for any elected government as it chooses policies must be
popular support.  Assume, therefore, that the government sets trade policy so as to
maximize votes.  One may wonder why, in a democratic system, a government would
need any more than half the votes.  There are two reasons why it makes sense to
assume that the government maximizes votes when setting trade policy.  First, trade
policy is only one piece of the broader policy realm that determines total popular
support.  Thus, if one assumes that the number of votes won or lost through trade policy
is small relative to the total required to maintain office, then it makes sense to assume
that the government wants to maximize votes when setting trade policy.  In effect, we
assume that national elections and the make-up of Congress do not turn on trade
policy.
Second, even if trade policy is crucial to national electoral outcomes,
governments have good reason to maximize votes beyond the majority level.  A larger
majority in the legislature makes it more likely that the government’s overall agenda will
be implemented.  Also, super-majorities increase the scope for retaining the support of
key people through the dispensing of patronage jobs and other perks.  Thus,
                                           
7  We rule out subsidies since they differ fundamentally from trade barriers in requiring appropriations of
funds.  See Rodrik 1986 and Wilson 1990 for models in which trade barriers are chosen even when
subsidies are available.  The basic idea is that, in political economic equilibrium, using the less efficient
trade barriers may result in less deadweight loss, since more efficient policies, such as subsidies, may be
used to a greater degree.8
maximizing total votes can increase the government’s ability to retain power over time.
The government’s objective function therefore has the following form:
         ) ( ) ( ) ( p p p cC V V
T + = , (3)
p: the vector of prices of all non-numeriare goods,
V(p): the total votes received by the government,
V
T(p): votes received directly as a result of trade policy, and not as a
result of campaigning,
C(p): total contributions received from lobbyists,
c: the fraction of a vote that $1 of contributions will buy.
When setting trade policy, the government generates votes through two channels.  First,
the policy wins or loses votes directly as a result of its impact on people’s well being.
Protection wins the votes of workers who gain or retain jobs as a result of that industry’s
production being propped up and may lose the votes of some consumers of that
product.  Second, lobbyists make contributions to the government in an effort to
influence policy: imposing protection presumably wins the monetary support of
organized beneficiaries.  Politicians can then spend these funds on campaigning in
order to “buy” those votes which have not been won, or have been lost, directly through
trade policy.  Let us turn to a discussion of what kinds of instruments governments use
to restrict imports.
2.4 Types of Trade Barriers and Their Political Economy Impacts
Different kinds of trade barriers may have different political and economic effects.
There are two broad classes of barriers: trade taxes, such as tariffs and other duties,9
and “non-revenue barriers” (NRBs), which restrict the quantity of imports without
generating tax revenues.  There are a variety of such barriers, including quotas, VERs,
heavy-handed government regulation, biased government procurement, lax antitrust
enforcement, unduly restrictive health and safety standards, burdensome customs
procedures, and threats.  All such NRBs create rents: any entity that has the privilege of
selling the imported good collects, on each unit sold, a rent equal to the gap between
the domestic price of the good and its world price.
A crucial question for any model of trade or protection is: What happens to those
revenues or rents?  In the case of trade taxes, economists usually assume that the
revenue gets rebated lump sum to the populace, so that this revenue can be grouped
with consumer surplus in the analysis.  This is what GH assume.  With NRBs, though, it
appears less palatable to assume that rents get rebated lump-sum, since it seems likely
that people will compete for the rents.  In addition, even with trade taxes, lump-sum
rebating rarely occurs in practice.  Thus, it makes sense to explore what happens if we
do not invoke this assumption.
We assume, therefore, that the revenues or rents that trade barriers generate
become the object of political competition.  In the case of NRBs, importers will vie for
the right to import restricted goods.  They will make contributions and otherwise curry
policy makers’ favor in efforts to win the right to import, just as producers seek trade
protection.  As for trade taxes, assume similarly that those revenues become the object
of lobbying.  Thus, no matter what the trade barrier used, the import rents generated10
produce contributions from those seeking to capture those rents.
8  Importers will seek
import rents, while those seeking revenues may not necessarily be importers.
Nevertheless, to simplify the exposition, in what follows, all who seek for rents or
revenues will be referred to as importers.
9
2.5  Votes and Protection
As described above, protection creates jobs for unemployed workers (or prevents
the layoff of employed workers).  Assume that each worker hired as a result of
protection will switch her or his vote from opposing the government (because he or she
was unemployed) to supporting the government.  Thus, if  ) ( i
d
i p L  represents labor
demand in industry i, then protection in that industry will directly generate 
* ) ( i i
d
i L p L -
votes, where 
*
i L  is the amount of labor demanded when trade is free.
10,11
Aside from the direct impact of protection on votes via job creation, protection
can also be expected to cause a loss of votes from among consumers who have to pay
                                           
8 It is perhaps more accurate to allow for both lump-sum rebating of trade taxes and the seeking of import
rents.  Treating trade tax revenue and other import rents differently, however, complicates the analysis
without a commensurate gain in insight.  Bhagwati 1982 discusses the very real possibility of revenue
seeking, as well as rent seeking.  Also, the greater use of NRBs compared to trade taxes implies that
import rents significantly outweigh trade tax revenues.
9  This framework encompasses VERs, if we assume that foreign producers lobby the importing country’s
government.  Recent events show that such foreign lobbying occurs frequently.
10  The results do not depend on having each worker who gets hired or fired switch her or his vote.  As
long as some fraction of these workers switch, the results go through.  Also, an extension of this
framework would be to model more explicitly who will switch votes as a result of being hired or fired.  For
instance, higher skilled workers may be better able to absorb the blow of job loss and thus may be less
likely to switch from support to opposition if fired (and from opposition to support if hired).
11  We abstract from any job impacts on importers.  Restricting imports, while creating rents for those who
are allowed to continue to import under the tightened regime, can be expected to lead to job loss in the
importing sector.  Importing, however, is not very labor intensive, so the total jobs lost through reducing
imports will be relatively small.  To account for this effect would complicate the algebra without
significantly affecting the results.11
higher prices and thus suffer a loss of wealth.  In many cases, the loss of consumer
surplus resulting from protection is small enough to be ignored by consumers.  The
great majority of US citizens, for instance, simply accept without complaint (or are
unaware of) the extra $5 per year that they pay because of the sugar quota.
Nevertheless, many citizens groups have lobbied against protection in the US (see
Destler and Odell 1987) and presumably in other countries.
12  Thus, with 100 million
voters in the US and large numbers in other OECD countries, we can expect protection
to result in the loss of a fair number of votes, because of the large amount of wealth
which is extracted from consumers through trade barriers.  It is assumed that the
number of votes lost is directly proportional to the loss of consumer surplus.  In
particular, let the number of votes lost through protection be given by  ] ) ( [
*
i i i s p s a - .  The
parameter a represents the votes lost per dollar of lost consumer surplus, and si* is the
free trade level of consumer surplus.  a is constant across all industries.
13 
2.6 Lobbying and Protection
We do not model the choice of whether to form a lobby.  Instead, following GH,
we appeal to Olson’s 1965 work on collective action to make the following assumptions:
1) All owners of specific capital within an industry have trade policy stakes that are high
enough to justify incurring the costs required to form lobbies.  2) Importers, too, find it
worthwhile to form lobbies.  3) Individual consumers’ stakes are low enough so that
                                           
12  Also, retailers often end up representing consumer interests by lobbying for free trade.  See Feenstra
1998.
13  Another possible extension to this model would be to allow a to vary across industries.  For instance,
consumers may be more forgiving of protection for industries in which wages are low.12
there are no consumer lobbies.  Nevertheless, the total stakes for consumers are so
high that the effect of protection on them as a group will not be ignored.
14
We now specify the lobbies’ welfare functions.  Assume that the membership of
each lobby is small enough such that it represents a negligible fraction of the total
population.  This assumption allows us to ignore the total consumer surplus derived by
any one lobby.  In general, then, the total welfare of any producer lobby simply equals
total profits accruing to the specific factor owners in that industry:
) ( ) ( p = p w i i i
P
i p .                                 (4)
Similarly, assume that the total welfare of importers is equal to the total rents from
importing in that sector.  This implies that free trade profits for importers are 0.  The total
welfare of importers is thus given by:
    ) ( ) ( ) (
* p m p - p = p w i i i i i
M
i ,                                 (5)
mi : imports in sector i.
Producers and importers make contributions to the government in an effort to win
                                           
14  There are no intermediate goods in this model.  With intermediate goods, we might expect to see
industries lobbying against protection on those goods, just as US laptop makers lobbied hard against
protection on Japanese flat-panel display screens.  While there are examples such as these, such
lobbying is rare compared to lobbying for protection for one’s own product.  See Nelson 1996 on the
principle of “reciprocal noninterference”.13
rents.  Assume that both groups engage in efficient bargaining with the government.
Thus, contributions for producers and importers are given respectively by:
P
i i i i
P
i K p = p C - ) ( ) ( p ,                                         (6)
IM
i i i i i i
IM
i K p m p - p = p C - ) ( ) ( ) (
* ,              (7)
Ki
P,Ki
IM: the amount of rents that producers and importers retain in the
bargain.
We assume that amassing contributions and transferring them to the government
is not costless.  There will be, as with most any trade, marginal transactions costs that
dissipate some fraction of the contributions before they can be put to use by policy
makers.  Raising money from members of the lobby will require resources, with the
amount of resources used increasing with the amount of funds to be raised per time
period.  Also, some portion of lobbying contributions consists of in-kind payments, rather
than simple transfers of money.  Lobbyists may wine and dine policy makers, invite
them to ski retreats, or bestow gifts.  Such in-kind payments will certainly incur
transactions costs—resources spent which do not benefit the policy maker.  Because of
these fund-raising and in-kind payment costs, we assume that the costs of contributions




i b  and 
IM b  represent the fraction of contributions that actually makes it into
the hands of policy makers.  Call these fractions the “transfer ratios”.  Thus, the costs of
                                           
15  The transactions costs are not necessarily large, but the model allows for the likelihood that they will be
non-zero.  It is quite possible within the model to set these costs equal to 0, but the approach outlined
here will allow the data to determine whether such a simplification is justified.14
lobbying, as a percentage of total contributions, are given by 
P
i b - 1  for producers and
IM b - 1  for importers.  Since importers are relatively homogeneous, we take 
IM b  to be
constant for all sectors.  Producing industries, on the other hand, differ widely in their
characteristics, so the transfer ratio for producers, 
P
i b , is allowed to vary by sector.
We expect more diffuse industries to have more difficulty coordinating their lobbying
efforts because of larger incentives to free ride, since protection granted to any one firm
is granted to all.  For instance, if an industry’s output is concentrated in a fairly small
number of firms, then that industry should find it relatively easy to raise funds from
members and transfer the funds to politicians.  On the other hand, industries with lots of
firms will need to spend more for each dollar contributed.  Thus, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that 
P
i b , and thus protection, will be increasing in such variables as the 4-
firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index and decreasing in the number of firms
in an industry.
16  Also, industries that have strong unions can be expected to have
greater lobbying clout and fewer free rider problems, which leads to the hypothesis that
P
i b , and thus protection, will be increasing in an industry’s unionization rate.  Many
empirical papers have analyzed such variables, but the modeling here allows us to test
for the impact of such characteristics within a coherent theoretical framework.
Assume that politicians value contributions because they can be used to buy
votes through campaign spending.  Also, assume that campaign funds can win votes
                                           
16  See Chapter 6 of Magee, Brock, and Young 1989 for an interesting discussion and a formal model of
contributions made by lobbies seeking trade protection.  They pay particular attention to free riding
problems, and, in one formulation, they show that total contributions are given by the Herfindahl index
times total sales in the industry.15
more effectively than does the direct bestowal of rents.  Put another way, $1 million
spent on campaigning wins back more votes than are lost through extracting $1 million
in surplus from consumers.  Thus, each campaign dollar is assumed to buy back c
votes, where c > a.
3 OPTIMAL PROTECTION IN POLITICAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
The above discussion implies that the government’s objective function can be
written as:
    )] ) ( ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ) ( [( ) (
* s - p s a + p C b + p C b c L p L = V
*












1 = i + - ￿ p .      (8)
Actual contributions received have been scaled back with the b terms, to account for the
transactions costs associated with lobbying.
The government will choose the price in each sector so as to maximize votes,
taking account of the jobs gained, the contributions induced, and the consumer votes
lost by such a choice.  Taking the derivative of V with respect to a representative price,
pi, and suppressing the dependence of labor demand, output, and imports on the price,
we find:16
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eL,p: the elasticity of labor demand,
e(m,p),i: the elasticity of import demand in sector i (defined to be > 0),
* p y y i i = : the value of output at free trade prices,
* p m m i i = : the value of imports at free trade prices.
17
This expression is our prediction for protection levels in import-competing industries in
industrialized democracies.
18  (See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the result.)
4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The above modeling provides theoretical backing for a number of results:
Result 1: Protection is increasing in the number of workers in a given
sector.  Since  i P ~ is bounded by 0 and 1 and  i L  enters additively into the numerator and
the denominator,  i P ~ is monotonically increasing in  i L .  In short, jobs matter.  The GH
model and its variants abstract from jobs and voting.  It is a robust empirical finding,
however, that jobs do matter.  This model provides theoretical backing for this
                                           
17   i P ~  maps protection onto the [0,1) interval.  This formulation follows GH and Goldberg and Maggi.
Also, the two elasticities can theoretically depend on the price, but we have suppressed this dependence
as well.
18  We assume no negative protection, so that  i P
~  is bounded below by 0.  Negative values of  i P
~ would
imply import subsidies, which we rule out because they hurt producers.  Such subsidies go against our
assumption that producers are organized and consumers are not.  This assumption appears to be
innocuous since it turns out that all the industries in our sample get positive protection.  Manipulation of
equation 9 shows that  0
~
< i P  if  m cb a y cb a L e
IM P
p L ) ( ) ( , - + - < .  This means that a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for there to be a corner solution at the lower bound is to have 
P cb a >  or 
IM cb a > .  If
one of these inequalities holds, then that sector may get no protection, with the chances of it getting no
protection increasing as a increases and as L, eL,p, c, b
P, and b
IM decrease.17
proposition which has not, to our knowledge, been captured formally.
Result 2:  The higher the elasticity of labor demand, the greater the
protection.  The same reasoning for Result 1 leads to the conclusion that  i P ~ is
increasing in  p L e , .  Industries that will hire lots of workers in response to a price increase
will also provide lots of votes if granted protection.
Result 3: Industries with lower transactions costs associated with lobbying
receive more protection.  It is clear from equation 9 that protection is increasing in 
P
i b .
Recall that a higher 
P
i b  implies lower transactions costs.  As discussed above,
transactions costs are probably closely connected to the extent of free riding, which, it is
reasonable to suppose, decreases as industry concentration or unionization or both
increase.  Thus, we would expect protection to increase with these, or related, variables.
Result 4:  Importers want neither free trade nor autarky but some
intermediate level of protection that maximizes their rents.  To see this, note what
would happen to the price if all other special interests were removed from the game, ie,
if a, 
P






1 ~ , which is the
expression for the maximum revenue tariff, or, more generally, the maximum rent trade
barrier.  Importers want the price that maximizes rents, which means choosing a








                                           
19  This implies that  1 ), , ( > i p m e .  Even if  i p m e ), , (  is less than or equal to 1 at world prices, as the price rises,
i p m e ), , (  will exceed 1 at some point, as long as we assume that there is some upper limit on the price that
consumers are willing to pay for imports.18
Result 5:  Protection is increasing in output if  a cb
P
i > .  This results from the
fact that larger industries will receive a larger increase in rents for any given price
change.  Holding all else equal, including the number of workers, large industries will
have more resources to contribute to politicians in order to acquire more rents.  If,
however, c or 
P
i b  is quite low, meaning either that contributions are not valued enough
or that lobbying costs are high, then larger industries may get less protection.  In this
case, large industries cannot muster enough contributions to counteract the large
amount of consumer surplus that they would wipe out.
Result 6:  Protection is decreasing in imports if  a cb
IM £ .  Otherwise, the
connection between protection and imports is ambiguous.  See the appendix for a
proof.  If the clout of importers is small enough, so that  a cb
IM £ , then, holding
everything else equal, industries with more imports should get less protection, because
more imports means that protection for such an industry will result in a larger loss of
consumer surplus.  If, on the other hand, importers have enough clout relative to
consumers ( a cb
IM > ), then the fact that importers want an intermediate level of imports
creates an ambiguous connection between imports and the protection level.
Result 7:  Protection is decreasing in the elasticity of import demand.  (This
is clear by inspection of Equation 9.)  As with GH, we find that, since more elastic
demand leads to greater deadweight loss when prices are propped up, more elastic
import demand leads to less protection.
We now turn to the task of empirically testing the model’s predictions.19
5 EMPIRICS
First, we develop an empirical model based on the theoretical model.  Then, we
briefly describe the data.  Finally, we present and analyze the regression results.
5.1 An Econometric Model
In equation 9, imports, production, and labor demand are all endogenous with
respect to the level of protection.
20  To see how we can tackle endogeneity, first divide
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 (where we have divided the number of workers by the
value of output at world prices).  We can instrument for both of these by using factor
shares.  Goldberg and Maggi 1997 and Trefler 1993 have done so for import
penetration.  As with the Heckscher-Ohlin model, for the specific factors model, import
penetration will be some function of endowments.  It is reasonable to instrument for
                                           
20 As mentioned in note 15, both elasticities can be thought of as endogenous, but we assume that they
are constant around equilibrium.  This is a standard assumption for import demand elasticities.
Accounting for possible endogeneity would greatly complicate the analysis.20
labor intensity in the same way, since this, too, will depend on factor endowments.
Since we are not interested in the details of that dependence, we write each equation in
reduced form, as a simple linear function of factor shares.
21  
As mentioned above, we expect 
P b  to be some function of variables that reflect
the extent of transactions costs in lobbying.  The Trefler data set upon which we rely
has four such industry-level variables: 4-firm concentration ratio, geographical
concentration, number of firms, and the unionization rate.  Trefler scales the number of
firms by industry sales.  Thus, we will call his variable “scaled number of firms”.  We add
a fifth variable for which the number of firms is not scaled by industry sales and call it
“number of firms”.
22  We do not develop a full-blown model of the relation between these
variables and lobbying transactions costs.  Instead, for the empirical analysis below, we
specify a simple linear relation between 
P b  and each of the variables, so that we have
i
P P P x b b b 1 0 + = , where xi is a lobbying cost variable and i  indexes the five variables.
We will then let the data tell us whether, within the theoretical framework developed,
there is any relation between these proxies for lobbying costs and protection.
Thus, our econometric model can be written as:
                                           
21  We do not use labor variables as instruments, since labor is one of the endogenous variables.  The
instruments are: physical capital, inventories, cropland, pasture, forest, coal, petroleum, and minerals.
The data is that used in Trefler 1993.  The main results are robust to the choice of instruments, although
using a longer list of instruments increases the standard errors (as one would expect).
22  It turns out, though, that we cannot use simply the number of firms, because this has a huge range--
from 13 to nearly 10,000—and the estimation does not work.  So, we normalize number of firms to the
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i LOB : one of the lobbying costs variables,
bIM, bL: vectors of coefficients,
Z: a vector of factor shares,
e c b b b a   and   , , , , , 1 0
IM P P : parameters to be estimated or fixed, corresponding to
p L
IM P P e c b b b a , 1 0   and   , , , , , , respectively.
We assume that the error terms are jointly normally distributed and estimate the system
using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).
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5.2  The Data
We test the model using mid-80’s US data for 125 SIC 4-digit industries.  This
choice of country and time period stems from the fact that the endowments data needed
for the instruments is only readily available for the US in 1983 (Trefler 1993).
As mentioned above, we have developed new, industry-level measures of
protection.  The details of how these data were constructed are in Appendix 2.  In a
                                           
23  The dependent variable is constrained to be greater than or equal to 0 and less than 1, but it is neither
truncated nor censored.  There are no 0’s in our data, indicating no truncation.  Also, we have included all
final goods industries, except for prepared fish, for which the Feenstra data had no production data.
Thus, no industries were dropped because their protection level was below 0, indicating no censoring.
We also estimated the system using non-linear 2-stage least squares and got very similar point estimates,
with larger standard errors.22
nutshell, we have used detailed price data from the OECD to construct tariff equivalent
price gaps that capture any and all barriers to international arbitrage for a sample of 6
OECD countries.  These protection measures are from 1985.
The employment data also comes from Trefler and is 1983 US data.  For each
industry, the total number of workers was calculated by dividing the number of
employees by one minus the unemployment rate for that industry.  This employment
data was then adjusted to account for intra-industry trade.  Since some output from
each industry (with a couple of exceptions) gets exported, the number of workers was
multiplied by the ratio of non-exported production to total production, to arrive at an
estimate of the number of import-competing workers for that sector.
The data on production and exports comes from the Feenstra data set at the
NBER website.  This was also the source of the import data needed to calculate import
penetration.  Output, too, is adjusted downward so that it only reflects import competing
production.  The lobbying cost variables--4-firm concentration ratio, geographical
concentration, number of firms, and unionization rates--all come from Trefler.
Like Goldberg and Maggi 1997, we take the elasticities data from Shiells, Stern,
and Deardorff 1986.  These estimates are considered to be the best available at the
level of disaggregation used in this empirical analysis.  Many other studies have used
these estimates.
Summary statistics for the key variables are shown in Table 1.
24
                                           
24  Our protection measures are nominal, even though specific capital owners care about effective
protection, which could, theoretically, differ substantially from nominal protection.  Unfortunately, it is most
difficult to calculate effective protection.  The standard measures of effective protection assume that there
is no substitutability among inputs and thus overstate true effective protection. There have been attempts
to overcome this problem (see Bureau and Lakaitzandonakes 1995 for one example), but to do so is23
5.3 Empirics
5.3.1 Estimating the Model
The equation for protection is homogeneous of degree 0 in a, c, and e and in
IM P P b b b   , , 1 0 , and c .  In the first case, doubling  p L e c a ,   and   , ,  would not affect P ~.  In
effect, changing the units of dollars in which we measure votes does not affect
protection (just as changing the units in which we measure prices and income does not
affect demand).  In the second case, doubling the transactions costs for both lobby
groups while cutting in half the weight that policy makers place on contributions also
would not affect P ~.  Thus, one of a, c, and e must be pegged, and one of 
IM P P b b b   , , 1 0 ,
and c must be pegged.
We peg a and b
IM.  The significance of each of the estimated parameters is
invariant to the choice of a and b
IM.  Thus, the substantive results do not depend on the
calibration.  We peg a because we are most interested in what the data say about the
sign and significance of e and c.  These two parameters indicate whether jobs and
contributions, respectively, play important roles in the protection game.  What value
should be chosen for a?  Given that e, the elasticity of labor demand, is a parameter
that others have estimated in other contexts, it seems reasonable to choose a such that
the estimate for e comes out in a reasonable range.  Hammermash 1986, Table 8.3,
presents estimates of labor demand elasticities at the industry level, and they range
                                                                                                                                            
expensive and very few such estimates exist.  There are, as a result, no reliable estimates of effective
protection for the 125 sectors. In the end, it appears to make little difference empirically.  Using data from
Deardorff and Stern 1984, the correlation between nominal and effective protection for 18 2-digit sectors
in the US was .99.  (It was .93 for the EU and .87 for Japan.)24
from .20 to 1.03.  It turns out that setting a at .001 generates point estimates for e that
range from .18 to .51.
25  This value of a implies that each $1000 drop in consumer
surplus results in the loss of one vote.  Thus, a $25 billion drop in consumer surplus, or
about $100 per capita in the US, would result in the loss of 25 million votes nationwide.
We peg b
IM
 because, in addition to wanting to estimate c , as mentioned above,
we want to investigate the connection between lobbying costs and protection by actually
estimating 
P P
1 0   and   b b .  Unlike with a, however, there is no empirical work that might
shed light on reasonable values for b
IM .  Thus, the equation was estimated 10 times,
with b
IM set equal to all multiples of .1 ranging up to 1, since b
IM is bounded by 0 and 1.
The sign and significance of all three estimated parameters are robust to all choices of
b
IM.  We will focus our discussion on the results for b
IM = .9.  This value is chosen
because it seems likely that there are some transactions costs associated with importer
lobbying but that the majority of contributions from importers will not be dissipated.
Picking lower values for 
IM b , meaning higher transactions costs, would unequivocally
strengthen all the conclusions below.  We discuss the implications of assuming no
transactions costs ( 1 =
IM b ) in footnote 24.  
5.3.2 The Empirical Results
 The results of estimating equations 11, 12, and 13 using LIML are shown in
                                           
25   Increasing a by a factor of 10 reduces e by a factor of 10.  Thus, setting a equal to .01 would lead to
an estimate for e of less than .1.  Similarly, 10-fold reductions in a would increase e by a factor of 10.
Again, the significance of e does not depend on the choice of a.25
Table 2.  In each case, the point estimate for e is significantly positive at the 5% level.
Overall, it appears that industries with a greater number of workers do receive more
protection, holding the other key variables in the model constant.  This result confirms
the findings of Cheh 1974, Baldwin 1985, Hansen 1990, Finger and Harrison 1996, and
Goldberg and Maggi 1997.
The results for c provide unambiguous evidence that lobbying contributions
influence protection, just as votes do.  The point estimate is significantly greater than 0
in all cases.  Also, the estimate for c is significantly greater than the pegged value of a
in each case.  This implies that contribution dollars are more valuable to policy makers
than consumer surplus dollars.
26  The point estimate of c indicates that politicians find
contributions to be about 12% more valuable in terms of how many votes they can buy
than is consumer surplus.  In other words, $1 million dollars of contributions can
overcome about $1.12 million of lost consumer surplus.  This estimate seems a bit low
but also a bit more reasonable than that of Goldberg and Maggi, which implied that
producer contributions only receive about 2% more weight than does consumer surplus.
The results for the lobbying costs variables, 
P
0 b  and 
P
1 b , show that there are
significant transactions costs associated with lobbying (
P
0 b  is significantly less than 1)
                                           
26 This is the only conclusion that does not hold for all calibrations of b
IM.  In particular, if  1 =
IM b , then c
is significantly greater than a at only the 10% level for each of the lobbying variables except scaled
number of firms, for which c is not significantly greater than a at any reasonable significance level (t-stat
of .71).  The reason that the result weakens when we set 
IM b  at a higher level is that imputing more
influence to importers for a given amount of protection means that producers’ contributions may need to
receive less weight in order to best estimate the model with the given data.  If, however, we ignore the
lobbying costs variables, producer contributions do get a significantly (at the 5% level) higher weight than
consumer surplus for all values of 
IM b .26
but that there is a weak connection at best between the variables used and the extent of
those costs.  We find no evidence that geographical concentration or the number of
firms affect the ability of industries to lobby.  For the scaled number of firms and
unionization, 
P
1 b  is significant at the 10% level with the expected sign.  The 4-firm
concentration ratio is not significant at the 10% level, but, in a likelihood ratio test of the
column 1 model versus the model in column 6 (discussed below), we reject the latter in
favor of the former at the 5% level.  Thus, we have some evidence that fewer firms,
higher unionization rates, and higher concentration ratios do make it easier for
industries to lobby and win more protection.
27  The point estimates are so low, however,
that the estimated impact of these variables on lobbying transactions costs is quite
small.  For instance, halving the scaled number of firms from its mean of 20 per $100
million and doubling the unionization rate from its mean of 34% would, in each case,
only reduce lobbying transactions costs by about 1%.
28  In short, these variables are
weakly statistically significant and have little economic significance.
Given this weak connection between the lobbying cost variables and the
                                           
27  There are conflicting empirical results in the literature on the connection between concentration and
protection.  Helleiner 1977 and Trefler 1993 find a positive relation.  Caves 1976 and Ray 1981 find a
negative relation.  Marvel and Ray 1983 find both, depending on the set of independent variables used.
Our results here clearly do not resolve this question, but it appears that a positive relation is more likely
than a negative one, especially given that, among previous studies, Trefler’s inspires the most
confidence.
28  Scaled number of firms is measured in firms per one million dollars, and the mean for this variable is
.20.  Since the estimate for the producer transfer ratio is given by  4 1 0 ˆ LOB b
P P P b b + = , the estimate for
P b  evaluated at the mean value of .20 is .891+(-.0123)(.20)=.88854.  Starting from the mean and cutting
4 LOB in half increases the estimate for 
P b  to .891 + (-.0123)(.10) = .88977.  Thus, the estimate for
transactions costs, which equals 
P b - 1 , is reduced from .1115 to .1102, only a 1% reduction.  A similar
calculation for unionization,  5 LOB , shows that increasing unionization from its mean of .34 to .68,
increases the estimate for  5 LOB  from .886+(.00364)(.34)=.88724 to .88848.  Thus, the estimate for
transactions costs decreases from .1128 to .1115, which is also a 1% reduction.27
producer transfer ratio, we re-estimated the equation without a lobbying cost variable.
Thus, we assumed that 
P b  simply equals a constant, 
P
0 b .  The result of this restricted
model is reported in the sixth column of Table 2.  As with all the other regressions,
P
0   and   , , b c e  are significantly positive.  Notice also that 
P
0 b  is significantly less than 
IM b ,
which has been set at .9.  This implies that transactions costs for producer lobbies are
significantly higher than for importers.  The estimate of .886 implies that the transactions
costs for producers are 14% higher than for importers.  (.114 is 14% greater than .1.)
Is protection increasing in output?  The GH model says unequivocally that it is,
while Goldberg and Maggi 1997 and Godek 1985 have found empirical evidence for this
proposition.  Recall from Result 5 above that, in our framework, protection increases in
output if  a cb
P > .  This means that we have empirical evidence that protection
increases in output if  ) ( 1 0 i
P P LOB b b c +  is significantly greater than a .  Using the mean
of each lobbying cost variable, we find that, for all six columns in Table 2,
) ( 1 0 i
P P LOB b b c +  is not significantly greater than a .  Thus, we have no evidence that
protection is increasing in output.  While policy makers do value contributions more than
consumer surplus, the presence of transactions costs apparently diminishes producer
influence to the point where the contributions from large producers cannot outweigh the
large consumer costs inflicted by protecting those large producers.
5.3.3 Comparison with the GH Model
While we have confirmed most of our model’s theoretical predictions, it will be
useful to check the sturdiness of these results by comparing our framework with GH’s.28
The GH framework allows for cross-industry lobbying and for the possibility that some
industries will not be organized for lobbying.  Neither of these applies to our analysis
because our data only covers final goods industries (against which no industries will
lobby) and because all industries in our data set receive some protection (implying that
they are all organized).
Assuming, then, that all import competing industries are organized for lobbying
and that there is no cross-industry lobbying, the GH result is:












* ~ .          (14)
Here a
GH is a parameter that measures how much weight the government places on
overall welfare relative to contributions.
Equation (14) is a constrained version of our model, with three restrictions:
0 , = p L e ,  0 1 =
P b  (or 
P P b b 0 = ), and  a cb
IM = . The first restriction comes from not
accounting for the role of jobs and voting in the politics of protection.  The second
comes from not allowing lobbying strength to vary by industry.  The third constraint
comes from assuming that import rents and revenues get rebated lump-sum to the
populace.  Thus, those rents get a weight of a instead of 
IM cb .  As shown in Table 2, e
is significant in all 6 specifications.  As discussed above, Table 2 also shows that, for 3
of the 5 politics variables, including a measure of lobbying costs does significantly
improve the fit.  As for the third restriction, in 3 of the specifications—number of firms,29
unionization rate, and no lobbying costs—we have  a cb >
IM  at the 5% level.  These
facts imply that our more general model adds significant explanatory power to the GH
model that applies to final goods.  Indeed, the log-likelihood for this modified GH model
is –49.9, far less than the log-likelihoods shown in Table 4.
Thus, we cannot justify all the restrictions required by the GH model.  This raises
the question: Can we get away with imposing just one or two of them, and thus have a
somewhat more elegant model?  We have already seen that imposing the second
restriction is justified for 2 of the 5 lobbying cost variables.  Imposing the first restriction,
0 , = p L e , which says that jobs and votes do not matter, is not justified.  Doing so drops
the log-likelihood down to the --31 to –33 range, depending on which lobbying cost
variable is used.
29  Imposing the third restriction ( a cb
IM = ), however, which assumes
that all imports rents are rebated lump-sum, does turn out to be justified.  The
theoretical result when we assume lump-sum rebating ( a cb
































.                    (15)
Thus, the main econometric equation becomes:
                                           
29  The results are not reported here.  With this restriction, only scaled number of firms and unionization
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Once again, we need to peg either  s '   the   of   one   or   b c , as well as a.  So, we set 
P
0 b
equal to the point estimates from the previous results shown in Table 2.
30
We report the results for this restricted model in Table 3.  The logs of the
likelihood functions are only slightly less than the values for the general model.  In fact,
likelihood ratio tests show that we cannot reject this model in favor of the more general
one, even at the 10% level.  The estimate for e is, once again, significantly positive in all
cases, confirming that jobs matter.  e is significantly positive at the 1% level for 4 of the
specifications: 4-firm concentration, scaled number of firms, unionization rate, and no
lobbying cost variable.  As before, the estimate for c is significantly positive and is
significantly greater than the calibrated value of a, confirming that politicians do indeed
value contributions more than wealth spread across the populace.  The results for the
lobbying cost variables are similar to the previous results, except that the unionization
rate is now significantly positive at the 5% level, rather than the 10% level.  For the
same 3 variables--4-firm concentration, scaled number of firms, and unionization rate--
including them does lead one to reject the model with no lobbying cost variable.  As
before, though, these variables have limited economic significance.
Thus, the econometric analysis shows that our model does extend the GH model
                                           
30  The log-likelihood does not depend on the choice of 
P
0 b .  Also, the point estimates change very little
as we vary 
P
0 b .31
in empirically meaningful ways.  We have strong evidence that jobs and voting influence
protection levels and limited evidence that lobbying cost variables are important.  We
also find, however, that adding importer lobbying to the protection game does not add
significant explanatory power.  While importer lobbying does occur, it appears that the
age-old assumption of lump-sum rebating need not be abandoned, at least according to
the framework and data used in this analysis.
31
6 CONCLUSION
We have developed a protection model that takes account of the fact that
politicians win support through creating or preserving jobs, as well as through campaign
spending.  In fact, we may think of job preservation as a direct way, and campaign
spending as an indirect way, of winning votes.  The modeling implies that protection for
an industry will be increasing in: 1) The number of workers in that industry, 2) The
elasticity of labor demand, and 3) The industry transfer ratio.  The result also implies
that protection is decreasing in the elasticity of import demand.  We have confirmed
these results empirically using new measures of protection.  The regressions also
provide evidence that politicians place about 12% more weight on campaign
contributions than on wealth for the average citizen.
The modeling also shows that there is no necessary connection between
protection levels and either output or imports.  In particular, if industries cannot organize
                                           
31  When we impose the restriction  0 , = p L e , then the lump-sum rebating assumption is too restrictive.
These results are not reported, since we know that  0 , = p L e  is too restrictive.32
well enough, protection may be decreasing in output.  Also, the impacts of both imports
and output on protection are conditioned by workers’ ability to influence policy makers
through voting.  For example, a larger sector will not necessarily receive more
protection than a smaller one if the latter is more labor-intensive than the former.  In
fact, our empirical analysis revealed no significant relation between industry size and
protection.
GH say in their 1994 article, footnote 11, that “our formula suggests that only two
variables (the elasticity of import demand and the ratio of domestic output to imports)
should explain the cross-industry variation in protection levels.”  The results in this
paper provide solid evidence that an additional variable, number of workers, matters for
determining why some sectors get lots of protection.  We have also provided some
evidence that unionization rates, the scaled number of firms, and the 4-firm
concentration ratio affect protection levels.  We did not find, however, any evidence that
one needs to replace the lump-sum rebating assumption with a formal specification of
the role that importers play in the protection game.
Our framework can accommodate modifications in order to test other
hypotheses.  For instance, to test whether there is a sympathy motive for protection, we
could let c depend on wages, skill levels, or industry growth, just as we have let 
P b
depend on lobbying cost variables.   It would also be useful to see whether we can
verify this papers’ conclusions with more recent data or data from other countries or
both.  While much work remains to be done, we hope that the modeling and empirics in
this paper have shed light, and will stimulate further research, on the complex
connections among rents, votes, and protection.33
APPENDIX 1: DERIVATION AND PROOF
Derivation of Equation 9
The objective function is
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where Equations 6 and 7 have been used to substitute for  ) (p C i
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i .
Taking the derivative with respect to a representative price, pi, and setting it
equal to 0, we get:
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Note that  i i y = ' p , by Hotelling’s Lemma, and  i i i i m y d s + = = ' .
Dropping the i subscripts and not writing out the explicit dependence of y, m, and
d on pi, we have the following:
p
L






















- + - + = - ￿ ) ( ) ( *) ( '








p L p m









= ,  and
m
p
m e p m ' , - = .
p m y a m b y b c L e p p m e cb
IM P
p L p m
IM )] ( ) ( [ *) ( , , + - + + = - ￿





IM + = + + - - ￿




m y a y b e m b c







+ + - -
+
= ￿
) ( ) ) 1 ( (
          







m y a y b e m b c
m e cb L e
p m y a y b e m b c















+ + - -
+
=
+ + - -
+
= ￿
m e cb L e










, ) ( ) ) 1 ( ( *
+
+ + - -
= ￿34
  .
) ( ) (
                                 






m e cb L e
m y a m b y b c L e
m e cb L e




















+ - + +
=
+




Proof of Result 6
Differentiating Equation 9 with respect to imports, we get:
2
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2 D  is the square of the denominator in Equation 9.  (We invoke the usual assumption
that the elasticities are constant, at least around equilibrium.)  The first term in
parentheses is positive, since all variables in the model are positive.  The term in square
brackets, which is the numerator of the equilibrium expression for P ~, is non-negative,
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 is unambiguously negative.  Otherwise, the
connection between the level of imports and the equilibrium protection level is unclear.35
APPENDIX 2: NEW PROTECTION MEASURES
Many researchers have attempted to measure the extent of protection at a fairly
detailed level of aggregation, but most such efforts are unreliable for a variety of
reasons.  Also, most of these studies are not comprehensive analyses of barriers to
trade because they focus only on explicit trade barriers and ignore the possible
protective effects of other types of regulations.  We have developed for six OECD
countries disaggregated measures of protection that, we believe, are more reliable than
others.  We will first provide an overview of other efforts to measure protection and then
briefly discuss how we developed ours.
32
A1 OTHER ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE PROTECTION
The greatest obstacle to accurately measuring the openness of markets is the
fact that nations can protect their industries in any of many different ways, as discussed
above.  Accounting for all possible barriers, not just visible ones, clearly is not
straightforward.  There are 3 main approaches to this thorny problem in the literature.
33
We discuss each approach and its shortcomings and then describe a new approach.
Method 1: Estimate a trade model and use the gap between predicted and
actual trade flows to infer the extent of protection.  (See Leamer 1988 and
Saxonhouse and Stern 1989.)
This approach requires having a model that can accurately account for all
determinants of trade, besides barriers.  This is an overly ambitious requirement for any
trade model.  One can use the residuals to infer the extent of trade barriers, but who is
to say how much of any residual results from barriers and how much results from model
misspecification or data mismeasurement or both?
Method 2: Count NTBs.  (See Laird and Yeats 1990 for a description of various
NTBs and a survey of other relevant references.)   
The United Nations maintains extensive data on NTB incidence.  These data are
calculated by computing what percentage of products within a sector has any kind of
NTB.
34  These measures are flawed because they do not take account of how restrictive
each barrier is.  One sector may have a lot of products that are subject to minor NTB’s.
Another sector may have just a few products with very restrictive NTB’s.  The first sector
would have a much higher NTB incidence measure, while we would expect the second
sector to actually be more restricted by trade barriers.  It is also unclear whether all
NTB’s have been accounted for in the UN’s accounting.  Finally, these measures are
incomplete in that they ignore all trade taxes.
Method 3: Infer price gaps by using unit values derived from detailed trade
data.  (See Sazanami et al 1995, Knetter 1994, and Swagel 1995.)  
Unit values are notoriously inexact measures of prices because of large quality
differences in products.  For instance, Sazanami et al derive tariff equivalents by
                                           
32 For a more thorough discussion of these new measures, see Bradford 1998.
33  See Baldwin 1989, Deardorff and Stern 1985, Laird and Yeats 1990, and USITC 1995 for overviews of
some of the issues.
34 These are the measures used by Goldberg and Maggi and by Trefler in their empirical analyses.36
comparing the unit values of domestically produced goods and imported goods in the
same product category.  It turns out that the unit values of radios and televisions
produced in Japan are six times higher than the unit values of radios and TV’s imported
into Japan.  The actual level of protection, though, is probably much less than this
because Japanese radios and TV’s are generally of much higher quality than those that
the Japanese import.
A2 A NEW APPROACH
We develop a fourth approach.  It is similar to that in Roningen and Yeats 1976 in
that we rely on retail prices.  With so many possible barriers to trade, the only way to
account for all of them is to exploit the information which prices concisely convey.  If a
gap in price exists for equivalent goods in two different markets, after correcting for
unavoidable distribution and transport costs, then we can conclude that those markets
are protected, and, moreover, we can use the gap in price as a measure of the extent of
protection.  Thus, a single number, a price gap, if measured correctly, can tell us the
total effect of all possible barriers to integration.
35
A2.1 The Underlying Price Data
The protection measures are generated by exploiting data on carefully matched
retail prices that the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
collects for over 3000 final goods in order to calculate Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
estimates.  The researchers make every effort to ensure that products of the same
quality are compared across countries.  For most manufactured goods, the same make
and model are compared.  For other manufactured goods and food items, researchers
rely on an exact description of the items to be priced.  When it is difficult to find
appropriate matches based on model or on descriptions, researchers from the countries
involved travel to the other countries in order to examine which items would be most
appropriate matches for the items in their country.  The researchers have also called
upon the expertise of manufacturers, trade associations, and buyers for large stores in
order to determine matches.
Prices are collected at the level of the “basic heading”.  A basic heading cannot
be too broad or too narrow.  It cannot be so broad that very different products are
compared.  It cannot be so narrow that each product is only purchased in one country.
For instance, seaweed is too narrow, and food is too broad.  To be included in the
survey, each product must be accepted for pricing by at least one other country.  In the
end, not every product is priced in each country, but, as long as countries price their
own nominated products and a share of all other products nominated, relative prices for
each product and country can be calculated indirectly as well as directly.
36  This method
does not completely resolve the problem of comparing items of different qualities, but
                                           
35 Sazanami et al had the right idea, but they did not implement it properly because they used unit values
and thus were not able to compare equivalent goods.  A price gap does not provide useful information to
the extent that the goods compared are not equivalent.
36 For details on how the prices are combined into one average price for each country see Eurostat-
OECD PPP Programme 1996.37
the scale of resources expended on accurate matching clearly indicates that these are
excellent measures of price differences for equivalent products.  There are about 200
product categories, and the sample has been trimmed to 125 traded goods.  Data is
available for 1985, 1990, and 1993, and protection measures have been derived for
each of those years.  See Table A1 for a list of the products.
A2.2 The Derivation of Protection Measures
The OECD data consists of consumer prices, not the producer prices that one
needs to measure how much an industry is protected from world markets.
37  We convert
the OECD prices, however, to producer prices using data on margins: wholesale trade,
retail trade, transportation, and taxes.
38  Estimates of producer prices were generated









=                               (A1)
pij
p: the producer price of good i in country j,
pij
c: the consumer price of good i in country j, as taken from the OECD data,
mij: the margin for good i in country j.
Producer prices alone do not indicate the extent of protection.  We must also
take account of transport costs from one nation’s market to another and compare each
producer price to the landed price of the foreign good.  We infer the landed price by
using data on export margins and data on international transport costs, as follows.
39   By
adding the export margins to the producer prices, the export price is found for each
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pij
e: the export price of good i for country j,
emij: the export margin of good i for country j.
The landed price, which is a proxy for the unobserved world price, is then found by
adding the international transport cost to the lowest export price in the sample:
                                           
37 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)-US Department of Commerce retail
price survey (MITI 1992) has been used by some as evidence of protection in Japan.  But retail prices do
not reflect protection for producers to the extent that domestic trade margins differ by country.  Since, as
discussed below, margins can vary widely, a simple comparison of retail prices probably cannot provide
reliable information on protection.  See Yager 1991 and Noland 1995, however, for interesting analyses of
the MITI data.
38 Roningen and Yeats 1976 also use retail prices and adjust for taxes and transport costs, but they do
not adjust for wholesale and retail trade margins, which, in general, significantly outweigh taxes and
transport costs.
39 For details on the margins and international transport costs data, see Bradford 1998.38
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pij
l: the landed price of good i into country j,
tri: the international transport margin for good i,






1j iM = , the minimum of the 6 export prices.
The ratio of each country’s producer price to the common landed price was then
used as a preliminary measure of protection.  Thus, preliminary protection, pprij, is given
by:







ppr = .                                    (A4)
These measures will differ from true protection measures if each of the six
countries has substantial barriers to imports.  For such goods, the calculated landed
price will be higher than the true world price to the extent that the low cost producer in
the sample has barriers against imports.  This will bias the protection measures
downward.  By the same token, if just one of the six has no barriers to imports in that
good, then these measures will not be biased downward, because, in this case, prices
in the free trading country will approximate world prices.  Since the sample includes
Canada and the US, which are considered to be generally free traders, we can safely
conclude that the low price in the sample will approximate the world price a majority of
the time.  Nevertheless, we use data on trade taxes to correct, at least partially, for the
possible downward bias.  The final measure of protection is given by:
       ) ( ij ij ij t ,1 ppr max pr + = ,                       (A5)
tij: the tariff rate for good i in country j.
We simply use the fact that trade taxes provide a lower bound on protection.  If our
preliminary measures do not exceed the overall tariff rate, then that tariff rate is used as
the measure of protection.  After this correction, the only time that these protection
measures will be biased downward is when all six countries in the sample have non-
tariff barriers against the rest of the world.
The correlation between our new measures and the NTB incidence indices is
only .22.  So, these two data sets tell different stories and the choice of which to use
must be based on their methodologies.39
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N-3337-CUSJR.43TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
MEAN  MEDIAN MIN   MAX  
Regression Variables
Protection: P ~ .196 .146 .000999 .661
Labor Intensity (workers/$ million): 
y
L




 or IMP .198 .0782 2.33x10
-6 3.92
Elasticity of Import Demand:  p m e ,  or ELAS 2.15 1.07 .0420 23.9
Lobbying Cost Variables:
4-firm Concentration Ratio:  1 LOB .405 .382 .0700 .940
Geographical Concentration:  2 LOB .704 .708 .300 .996
Number of Firms:  3 LOB .0617 .0284 .00135 1.00
Scaled Number of Firms:  4 LOB .204 .121 .00155 1.54





1.31 1.17 1.001 2.95
Employment (thousands): L 57.3 26.0 2.20 1000
Production ($ million): y 6420 2820 73.1 183,000
Imports ($ million): m 579 212 .0167 17,500
Exports ($ million) 493 128 0 7540TABLE 2







Number of Observations: 125
a is set equal to .001.
b
IM is set equal to .9.
LOBBYING COST VARIABLE USED
Geograph-
4-Firm ical   Scaled Union-
Concen- Concen- Number Number  ization
tration        tration        of Firms     of Firms     Rate            None
Para- Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
meter         (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)
e   .251** .244** .215** .505** .251** .182**
(.134) (.141) (.122) (.219) (.124) (.105)









P  .888*** .888*** .888*** .891*** .886*** .886***
(.00804) (.00773) (.00715) (.0115) (.00707) (.00648)
b1
P .00141 .00075 -.00160 -.0123* .00364*
(.00243) (.00199) (.00785) (.00838) (.00279)
Log-
Likelihood1021.60 1019.87 1019.28 1025.84 1022.22 1019.19
*,**,***  Significant at the 10%,5%, or 1% level, respectively.  All are 1-tailed tests.  TABLE 3







Number of Observations: 125
a is set equal to .001.
p
0 b  is set equal to the point estimates shown in Table 7.
LOBBYING COST VARIABLE USED
Geograph-
4-Firm ical   Scaled Union-
Concen- Concen- Number Number  ization
tration        tration        of Firms     of Firms     Rate            None
Para- Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
meter         (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)     (St. Err.)
e   .341*** .342** .322** .568*** .333*** .258***
(.145) (.163) (.141) (.226) (.138) (.104)









P .00235 .00147 -.00426 -.0134* .00486**
(.00262) (.00227) (.0117) (.00914) (.00287)
Log-
Likelihood1021.06 1019.33 1018.72 1025.52 1021.52 1018.21
*,**,***  Significant at the 10%,5%, or 1% level, respectively.  All are 1-tailed tests.  48